

Online Workshop

: Epistemic Injustice and Education

Date: September 9, 2023

Venue: Zoom Online

Timetable:

10am-10:25am (the UK time) Kunimasa Sato (Ibaraki U)

Title: Opening Remarks & Overview of Epistemic Injustices in Education

10:25am-11:25am Alice Monypenny (U of Nottingham)

Title: Epistemic Injustice and Character Corruption: How Intellectual Vices Can Protect Agency

11:30am-12:30am Ben Kotzee (U of Birmingham)

Title: Epistemic Justice and Freedom of Speech

*The UK time is adopted. Japan and the UK have an 8 hours-time difference.

*The registration at Zoom is required.

Register in advance for this meeting:

<https://sophia-ac-jp.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJcvd-itqTkqGdyjPz7XHNpk3JM8eoPNQhjP>



After registering, you will receive a confirmation email containing information about joining the meeting.

*This event is sponsored by Phil of Edu Society of Japan and KAKENHI (23K0004).

Abstracts:

Kunimasa Sato, “Overview of Epistemic Injustice in Education”

Since the publication of Fricker’s seminal book *Epistemic Injustice* in 2007, the notion of epistemic injustice has vigorously been developed. In this opening talk, I give a very brief overview of the present studies of epistemic injustices in education. I then introduce my latest papers that originally contribute to epistemic injustice literature and announce a future research project that participants might be interested in, including the project to invite Prof. Fricker to Japan in 2024.

Alice Monypenny, “Epistemic Injustice and Character Corruption: How Intellectual vices Can Protect Agency”

Epistemic injustice has a range of negative effects for both individuals and epistemic communities. Especially when it occurs in the context of education, it can lead to what Ian James Kidd calls, the ‘corruption’ of epistemic character. This may occur when students are incentivised to develop ‘protective’ epistemic vices as coping strategies. For example, the development of intellectual servility may allow students to avoid further hostility by conforming to teachers’ or other students’ expectations. In this talk, I examine some of the factors which lead some students to develop vicious rather than virtuous coping strategies, as well as the implications of vicious coping strategies on the development of epistemic agency.

Ben Kotzee, “Epistemic Justice and Freedom of Speech”

In the literature on epistemic justice, the paradigm cases of epistemic injustices tend to be sketched in terms of propositional knowledge. For instance, the paradigm cases of testimonial injustice are cases of people who testify reliably to the truth of some proposition, but are not believed; and the paradigm cases of hermeneutic injustice concern someone’s ability to make intellectual sense of a situation given the resources of their culture.

However, it is crucial to notice that propositional knowledge is typically expressed or communicated in language. When a person testifies to something, they usually do so in speech or writing. For instance, Fricker’s signal example

of testimonial injustice, the fictional case of Marge Percy, involves one person speaking something to another person. Likewise, when a person tries to express their hermeneutic understanding of the world, they do so by speaking or writing about it. For instance, Fricker's signal example of hermeneutical injustice, the real case of Carmita Wood, also concerns someone speaking about something. Indeed, the case of Carmita Wood is a clear example of 'speaking out' about something: that is of speaking openly about something - in this case sexual harassment) that is not normally spoken about.

In this paper, I explore the link between the literature on epistemic justice (that is justice in how people attempt to communicate belief and knowledge to one another) and the literature on freedom of speech (that is, the rights and wrongs involved in saying and writing things generally). I ask after the touchpoints and differences between these two debates and explore whether one can offer a unified conception of epistemic justice and freedom of speech. Using educational examples, I explore whether freedom of speech is in any way a threat to epistemic justice in the classroom; I hold that, properly conceived, epistemic justice and freedom of speech are not a threat to one another, but promote the same goal of the advancement of knowledge.